Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts

Saturday, September 27, 2014

John R.W. Stott on Being Salt and Light

The world is evidently a dark place, with little or no light of its own, since an external source of light is needed to illumine it. True, it is "always talking about its enlightenment," but much of its boasted light is in reality darkness. The world also manifests a constantly tendency to deteriorate. The notion is not that the world is tasteless and that Christians can make it less insipid ("The thought of making the world palatable to God is quite impossible"), but that it is putrefying. It cannot stop itself from going bad. Only salt introduced from outside can do this. The church, on the other hand, is set in the world with a double role, as salt to arrest--or at least to hinder--the process of social decay, and as light to dispel the darkness.
What message do we have, then, for such people who feel themselves strangled by 'the system', crushed by the machine of modern technocracy, overwhelmed by political, social and economic forces which control them and over which they have no control? They feel themselves victims of a situation they are powerless to change. What can they do? It is in the soil of this frustration that revolutionaries are being bred, dedicated to the violent overthrow of the system. It is from the very same soil that revolutionaries of Jesus can arise, equally dedicated activists--even more so--but committed rather to spread his revolution of love, joy and peace. And this peaceful revolution is more radical than any programme of violence, both because its standards are incorruptible and because it changes people as well as structures. Have we lost our confidence? Then listen to Luther: "With his single word I can be more defiant and more boastful than they with all their power, swords and guns."
John R.W. Stott, Christian Counter-Culture: The Message of the Sermon on the Mount (InterVarsity Press, 1978), pgs. 58-59, 64.

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

John Murray on the Cultural Mandate

There is an indication in Genesis 1 and 2 of the variety which would have characterized his labours in a state of confirmed integrity. The other mandates—the replenishing of the earth and subduing it—involved labour also. Even in the genial conditions which would have obtained in an uncursed earth it is not difficult to imagine the labour entailed in geographical expansion and the necessity of making adequate provision for sustenance and comfort in this process of expansion. But more significant in respect of labour is the mandate to subdue the earth. This means nothing if it does not mean the harnessing and utilizing of the earth’s resources and forces. We are not to suppose that the earth is represented as offering resistance to man’s dominion and that the subduing was to be that of conquering alien and recalcitrant powers. But the subduing of the earth must imply the expenditure of thought and skill and energy in bringing the earth and its resources under such control that they would be channeled to the promotion of certain ends which they were suited and designed to fulfil but which would not be fulfilled part from the exercise of man’s design and labour. In the sense in which Jesus spoke of the Sabbath as made for man and not man for the Sabbath, so we may not say that the earth and its resources were made for man and not man for them; he was to exercise dominion over them, they were not to rule over him The earth and its resources were to be brought into the service of his well-being, enjoyment and pleasure.
John Murray, Principles of Conduct: Aspects of Biblical Ethics (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1957), 36-37.

Thursday, May 1, 2014

Thoughts on the Morality Debate

Tarun Iyer (left) and George Simopoulos (right)


Last month, a debate was held in the University of Toronto between George Simopoulos (Christian) and Tarun Iyer (Atheist) on the question, “Is God the Source of Morality?” I thought it was a good debate, and gave the chance for some budding young intellectuals to be able to demonstrate what they are capable of in the area of academic debate.

Representing the Christian side, George Simopoulos that “the idea of absolute value is at the heart of the human experience.” Christianity affirms that there is an objective standard for making value judgments, which makes sense of our intuitive judgments regarding pleasure and pain, He makes the argument that all morality and ethics is ultimately rooted in the Triune God of scripture. This is not just in terms of Divine Command Theory, where God makes something moral by declaring it to be thus. Rather, as George notes, goodness is inextricably tied to God's nature, and when God makes a command in scripture, He reveals something of His unchanging nature. He also makes the point that ethics matters because of teleology/eschatology: We are headed towards an end, which culminates in the final judgment and the inauguration of the new heavens and new earth. In that light, right and wrong matters because their consequences are eternal. Accordingly, the non-theist's worldview cannot account for categories of right and wrong. We cannot know if such categories truly exist or not, thus causing the non-theist to commit epistemological suicide. Our thoughts are like weather patterns and we have no reason to trust them, and while we can make descriptive statements, we cannot make prescriptive ones, for to do so is to commit the “is-ought fallacy.” Furthermore, since we are just a random assortment of atoms, there is nothing intrinsically valuable about human life if we take this Naturalistic perspective

Representing the Atheist side, Tarun Iyer argues that according to Humanism, we must take care of the intrinsic value of human life (how he arrives at the conclusion that human life has intrinsic value is not explained). He rejects the idea that a transcendent higher power is necessary for grounding moral value judgments, as we can scientifically determine whether actions are good or bad. He refers to the idea of objective morality as “the last bastion of religious argument.” He objects to the idea that a higher power allowed humanity to live in hundreds of thousands of years without knowledge of morality. According to Tarun, it is absurd for God to prohibit such things as homosexuality and polytheism, and that if we choose to interpret the Bible in its historical context, we thereby nullify its claim to be the Living Word of God. He further rejects the idea of the Bible being the basis for moral absolutes on the grounds that other sacred texts such as the Bhagavad Gita have been making moral claims at least a thousand years before it.

Based on the arguments raised by both sides, it can be seen that they are approaching the debate from completely different angles. Tarun approaches the question from a social-historical angle, pointing to particulars that, in his estimation, militate against the Christian worldview's claim to provide objective moral grounding. George does respond to some of these particulars, pointing out, for example, that differences among different Christian groups are on secondary issues and do do nt detract from the core consensus on moral views, and that despite perceived difficulties in interpreting certain biblical texts, a solid hermeneutic allows us to draw a coherent moral standard from the Bible. George does not dwell on these particulars, however, and instead, approaches the question from a philosophical angle, going beyond particulars and going into the meta-ethical considerations underpinning our moral judgments and intuitions. He ties in the ethical aspects of the Christian worldview to its metaphysical and teleological presuppositions. In so doing, George exposes the fact that while Tarun can make objections regarding specific historical details incidental to Christianity's morality claims, he cannot provide a viable alternative from a Naturalistic worldview. 

There were two questions that were posed to Tarun in the Q&A in the debate that illustrate this failure of Naturalism to provide a meaningful basis for morality. The first was when I pointed out to Tarun how he never provided a way out of the is-ought fallacy, and asked him how he got around it. He responded by denying the is-ought fallacy! This implies that we can derive moral imperatives simply by empirical observation (he repeats in his closing statement when he asserts that we do not need to make any presuppositions to arrive at truth; but only to make observations of the world around us). He then argued that the we can objectively measure the consequences of actions and make moral judgments based on those (incidentally, Tarun did not know what a teleological ethics is, even though that was basically what he espoused). He never explained how one determines what exactly we should measure in order to determine if something is good or not, other than a vague and undefined reference to “love and compassion,” never mind why we take such parameters to be the basis for moral judgment, as opposed to the parameters anyone else proposes.

The second question came towards the end of the Q&A, when someone asked Tarun whether all of humanity's achievements, moral or otherwise, will matter after the human race becomes extinct. Tarun's response to the question is to say that it would depend on whether or not anyone else comes along to be able to observe the remains of humanity's achievements. If sentient life were to disappear from the universe, then it ultimately would not matter. This reveals the anthropocentric nature of Tarun's worldview: Persons, actions and achievements have value because other persons assign value to them. But if there is no person to assign that value, then such value would not exist. Corollary to this is that there is no way to arbitrate between someone who assigns value to certain persons and actions, and another person who rejects such value judgments.

In addition to this are various miscellaneous problems with specific issues that Tarun brings up. He says, for example, that it is “implausible and obscene” that such a being then decided to reveal Himself in the Middle East rather than someplace more civilized, such as China. Leaving aside the implicit racism embedded in that comment, it is quite odd that anyone would think that God must give His revelation to a nation that (in the objector's estimation) is civilized enough to accept it, or that He must do so in a specific way and in a specific time and place in history, as though the objector imagines himself to have a better plan for spreading God's message than the way He actually did so.

The Hitler question was debated to death as well, both during the Q&A and in the post-debate discussions that ensued. Not even Richard Dawkins accepts the idea that Hitler was a Christian, arguing that the contradictory statements coming from him indicate either that Hitler deconverted at some point in the early 1940s, or that he is, in Dawkins' terms “an opportunistic liar whose words cannot be trusted, in either direction” (The God Delusion, ch. 7). It seems that no matter how many times it is pointed out that Hitler privately ridiculed Christianity as a “great scourge” “disease,” such statements are nullified by public statements by Hitler where he praises Christianity. Because you can always trust the sincerity of politicians who make religious professions in their public statements, yes?

Finally, there is the question of other sacred texts predating Christianity. First of all, Tarun makes a slight historical error with regards to the Bhagavad Gita: the probable date for its composition is around the fifth century B.C., at which point most of the Old Testament had already been written. Be that as it may, even if other cultures did draw from moral sources predating the Bible, this does not nullify the Christian claim in the least. The reason for this is that in the Christian worldview, natural revelation (as distinct from special revelation gives humanity its moral sense (cf. Romans 1-2). Special revelation via the Scriptures expands upon the moral compass that God placed in human beings, making explicit what is implicit and revealing that these moral values are not just human developments, but have divine sanction and transcend human beings. Funny enough, the relative uniformity of moral codes across cultures is precisely what we would expect if the words of Romans 1-2 were true, as opposed to the evolutionary explanation of morality provided by Naturalists.

Overall, I have to say that George presented the better case in this debate, as he was the more articulate speaker, and his arguments were much more cogent. I find Tarun's arguments lacking, as he demonstrates a lack of knowledge of the meta-ethical issues surrounding the debate regarding the source of morality, or even of the historical and sociological issues that he raised in his own presentations. Perhaps in the future, he would learn from this experience and present better arguments for a Naturalistic view of ethics.